

# The relationship between the monarch's legitimacy and women's capability in preserving Morocco's stability

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**Abstract:** After the 2011 protests, various events kicked off a range of movements from October 2016 to summer 2017 in Al-Houceima and Jerrada and re-lashed out again in late June of 2018. Many researchers found out that female activists have paramount importance in furthering these movements online and offline. Between the two periods 'before' and 'after' the Arab uprisings (Arab Spring), the paper investigates whether Moroccan women play a vital role in maintaining the state's stability or the opposite, in encouraging upheavals. This paper presents the results of a quantitative survey among 1000 Moroccans in 2018 on Moroccans' perception towards the upheavals. These results were generated using the latest version of statistical software (XLSTAT 2018) of data analysis solution. The findings throw light on new methodical insights on how the political and social agendas have been manageable for King Mohammed VI to legitimate himself in Moroccan people's eyes, especially women.

**Key words—**Social movements/ upheavals, female activism, King Mohammed VI, legitimacy, Morocco's stability, post-Arab uprisings, social change

## I. INTRODUCTION

Sustaining the Moroccan regime's demo-despotic status quo, Professor Bernard Cubertafond (2010) thinks that Morocco has undergone a thoughtful practice of "steps forward, one step back, or the reverse." The Moroccan monarchy's regime, according to him, is not very despotic like the Hassan II's reign, nor is it very democratic like Juan Carlos's. It is a balanced regime characterized by "democratic or pseudo-democratic elements," which plays under "a legal reality halfway between the police state and the state of rights." Since the accession of the King Mohammed VI to the throne, he has adjusted his reign and concept of authority by responding to people's needs on the ground and reacting to the growing expectations for political and social righteousness. Before firing any threats to the stability of the state, the Moroccan monarch addresses women's needs in particular and revisits various reforms and institutions that secure the monarch's durability. The current study investigates the relationship between the agenda of the Moroccan monarchy, in sustaining his legitimacy, and Moroccans' perception towards the upheavals.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW:

The Moroccan experience in initiating reforms from above by the King himself differs significantly from the other experiences in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. By making the exception, the secret behind Morocco's ability to escape the shock waves roiling after the Arab uprisings stems from the fact that Morocco possesses many societal and political features within a unique geographical core extending back more than 1200 years. To name a few, a hundred of years of ruling dynasty owning the bases of its legitimacy, a diverse popular culture within a religious homogeneity, and a unified national state with a particular nature of Moroccan Islam (Weitzman, Zisenwine, 2013), in addition to a remarkable ritualization of the public discourse, the King's traditional legitimacy, and his diplomatic skills. These features may all be distinctive facets of making the Moroccan case unique among other contexts.

According to Clifford Geertz, Moroccan Sultanate throughout history managed to fuse their legitimacy based on two principles. 'The principle that the ruler is ruler because he is supernaturally qualified to be so; and the principle that the ruler is ruler because the competent spokesmen of the community have collectively agreed he is' (Geertz, 1971, p.77). Since the founding of the Almoravid and Almohad Kingdoms in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, Moroccan sovereign force was based on personal charisma, institutional charisma, and traditional authority with their legitimacy potential. With the noteworthy political and demographic changes, King Mohammed VI tries to research alternative ways of legitimacy and patterns of domination. He is then forced to adjust his reign and concept of authority, especially that most of his subjects have many growing expectations for political and social righteousness.

Thus, the King and his advisors are significantly conscious about the challenges the region comes up with, the style of life people try to adopt, and the global challenges that Morocco needs to keep up with, but preserving its cultural identity. This awareness was decoded into immediate reactions either on the level of royal iconography, royal speeches or in terms of political reform initiatives (the inclusion of Tamazight in the national education plan, the reform of the election code, the reform of family status law, the last new constitution reform of 2011, the 'political earthquake'<sup>1</sup>, and the urgent feedbacks towards the COVID-19 pandemic...).

Given that, Morocco went through a new era of modernism that King Mohammed VI has tried to implement, but preserving Moroccan identity and traditions. Through his first speech, the King emphasized that Morocco cannot move forward if women do

<sup>1</sup>A big round of discharges was repeatedly made under King Mohammed VI's promise "political earthquake." Four ministers, five secretaries-general, and many other officials were sacked. After the Al-Houceima projects report, "Manarat al-Moutawassit" on October 24, 2017, severe dysfunctions and imbalances were exposed and date back to the previous Abdelilah Benkirane government (PJD). That led to various dismissals in the government of the Saad Eddine el Othmani (PJD) the Justice and Development Party.

not possess equal rights as well as for all people. The reforms that were integrated year after year were answering the agenda of the King towards empowering women and their status though they were a bit challenging to his legitimacy for his status as Amir al-Mu'minin (Leader of the Faithful), especially in what concerns the Modawana (family code of 2004). However, meeting the international standards of human rights and respecting the Islamic religious readings and modifications to the reform, the King succeeded in building a strong legitimacy that saved the state from various uprisings.

Considering the political, socio-economic, micro, and macro environments that the Moroccan state went through, the King's actions were sometimes visionary towards certain controversial women's issues. Other times, they were actions that tried to extinguish feminist activists' demands and civil society's authorities. Nevertheless, Moroccan women still suffer from other issues and have been mentioned in one of the monarch's speeches in 2014, and they still wait for decisive and courageous legislative implementations like fighting violence and discrimination against women<sup>2</sup>.

Many researchers found out that female activists had paramount importance in furthering movements that took place in Morocco, such as the famous ones Rif Hirak, Jerrada Hirak, and the movements against the prison sentences of the protest members of Rif Hirak. Many female activists took the lead and tried to take the 20F-M<sup>3</sup> and the Rif Hirak to the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution level. Women were also one of the significant trigger parts of other great social movements. Like the online boycott campaign against three consuming goods in May/ April 2018.

Nevertheless, in 2011, other female activists were anti these movements, stopped such protests, and announced the unique Moroccan case in North Africa and the Middle East. 2011 was the year of the institution amendment; it was also a year between two completely different periods before the Arab Spring and aftermath it. This year, women came back to appear strongly after their fadedness since the 2004 Reform announcement but still dragging with them the sticker of the marginalized segment. Another time, the King responds to the streets' demands and to the feminist activist movements that call for equality in political life. The 2011 constitution was again the best timing to address women by their needs and demands.

This opportunity was sensed in 2013, 2014, and 2017 King's speeches where women have changed their status from marginalized and weak members who need involvement and help to healthy citizens who call not for their rights only but their children's, brothers', fathers', and husbands' rights. They started to call for society's rights since they are not separate from society's issues that concern their lives directly and indirectly. As it was mentioned in one of the King's speeches: "women have been playing an active role in every single region in the Kingdom –whether in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. They have thus become real catalysts for comprehensive and sustainable development, and this is truly a source of pride and hope." (King Mohammed VI, 2013)

Furthermore, with the succession of upheavals after 2011's protest, especially the RIF Hirak in 2016-2017 and Jerrada Hirak in 2018, the King has brought the controversy of Moroccan women's engagement in the religious field. In addition to women's engagement as Islamic scholars (Ulema) and as spiritual guides (Murshidates) in Mosques, institutions, prisons, and hospitals, the King gave orders to provide the right to females to work as Aduls<sup>4</sup>.

Yet, the previous swallowable strategies working in the era of Benkirane have vanished in the Saad Eddine El-Othmani's era<sup>5</sup>. The 2018 and onwards were years of a mass recall of all the destroying decisions that directly hit the poor and the mid-class citizens. The government's decisions and reactions kicked out upheavals once in a while, even if most protests were online and did not take place in the streets. People demonstrated using mass media, especially Facebook, to agree upon and create their own decisions and beat all the government's and the state's threats. The PJD then was not the sponsor of stability anymore, as had been the case after each victory in 2011 and 2016, but they were indirect matchsticks that were ready to blow explosions anytime. Before each of these notable dates, the PJD had always threatened the state of triggering upheavals and challenging the country's stability. The same game that several parties have tried before and after the 2016 elections. Is the King then capable again of swallowing any challenges that might be created by Islamists or secular parties?

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<sup>2</sup>Eighteen years later, in 2022, the king again addressed Moroccan women in the Throne Day Speech. He insisted on the full participation of women in all sectors. According to him, reproducing reforms and constitutions that preserve equality between women and men are not sufficient. He added, 'the question here is not about giving women unwarranted privileges; rather, it is about giving them their legal and legitimate rights. Today, in Morocco, women cannot be deprived of their rights. ...Everyone should understand that giving women their rights does not mean it will be at the expense of women' (King Mohammed VI, 2022).

<sup>3</sup> Similar to the upheavals that marked the start of the Arab Uprisings (Arab Spring) in Tunisia and Egypt, February 20 Movement saw the light through Online calls under the name of the movement for 'Freedom and Democracy Now.' According to the organizers, it was successful in calling (240,000-300,000 participants in several towns; 37,000 according to the Ministry of the Interior, in more than 50 cities; Fernandez Molina, 2011:437). According to an AMDH member, the protestations reached its peak, with approximately 900,000 people taking to the streets in 110 demonstrations across different cities in the country on April 24, 2011 (Bergh & Rossi-Doria, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Aduls' role in Muslim law is to authorize legal formalities of matters that concern marriage and inheritance. In 2018, King Mohammed VI approved on allowing women to practice Adul's job (marriage officers/religious notary). After a year of debate among the male Aduls and Ulema (the religious scholars), the Higher Scientific Council finally released a fatwa under Article 4 of Law 16-03. A few days later, the ministry of justice declared 800 Aduls in which women constitute half of the participants. It is the first time in Morocco's history and among the Arab countries to give the right to women to practice this profession, which was for centuries limited to men only.

<sup>5</sup>On 8 September 2021, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) suffered an electoral annihilation and gained only 13 seats. It lost 112 seats. The National Rally of Independence led by Aziz Akhannouch won the general elections by 102 seats. The second place went to the liberal Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) with 87 seats. The center-right Istiqlal Party succeeded to take the third place with 81 seats (MAP).

A few years ago, with the use of a careful liberalization process, the Moroccan monarchy managed to swallow any secular or Islamist challenges by manipulating various state-institutions. The Moroccan Monarch has inherited a country with tremendous problems that he admitted during his first interview with Times Magazine in 2000, 'first of all, there are unemployment and drought in the countryside. There is also the fight against poverty. We could talk about this endlessly: poverty, misery, illiteracy" (Mohammed VI, 2000). Still, he is encountering many challenges that he faced courageously throughout many occasions naming, the Arab Spring upheavals (which has taken the form of 20 February Movement in Morocco), Rif Hirak and Jerrada Hirak, the call for renewable reforms, the remarkable speed of urbanization, the South Sahara issue, the Covid-19 Health Crisis and many other national and international issues. Despite all of these challenges, he tried to show quick responses to many social needs that have to do with different social segments that shape the Moroccan State through many developmental projects. However, is the King capable of following the new trend of citizens' sensitizing campaigns (against all, hashtagging everything and boycotting everything) that started to occur on social media, especially on Facebook?

The productive online and offline activism of Moroccan women during the Arab Uprisings took feminism and the whole region to a new activism wave. Online activism is connected to conventional activism, but they differ in many ways. Online activism offers the opportunity to focus on the organizations' efforts and endorse its goals quickly than traditional activism could do. It is like a "third space" that discloses the marginalized groups' power to voice their concerns, issues, and needs in a virtual space (Newsom and Lengel, 2012).

Overall, women were capable of succeeding in voicing their thoughts and have debates on all sorts of life's concerns because of the absence of hierarchy and traditional limits. There is no particular leader who feeds information or influences others to say so, and so, anyone can be a leader and influences others from any place in the world. The thing that led many Moroccan females to be part of the protests and anti-protests from the position they see it is right even without having any prior political or organizational involvement (Newsom and Lengel, 2012).

Putting all what have been said earlier into practice, according to Clements (2014), legitimacy then refers to contracts that govern relationships between the state and citizens. These contracts can be formal or informal and which is assessed in terms of its efficient workability. By definition, those who are ruled, be they individual citizens or tribal members, distinguish institutions and political actors in return for services that guarantee their individual and collective welfare. Legitimacy, in that case, diminishes if such welfare is not approaching. Thus, does this definition go hand in hand with the findings of this survey?

### III. RATIONALE AND PURPOSE:

The main purpose of this quantitative survey is to investigate Moroccans' behavior during the uprisings and to elicit the extent to which women help promote stability or encourage upheavals of 2011, 2016, 2017, and 2018. It also identifies who (females or males) have encouraged their family members to go into upheavals. Since the bottom-up aspect of the Moroccan regime legitimacy on understanding how those ruled perceive the legitimacy of the ruling regime through upheavals remains unexplored, the current paper contributes to investigating females' role in promoting peace.

### IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

To understand women's role in the bottom-up aspect of legitimacy and to examine the relationship between the state legitimacy and women's capability in preserving its stability, three main research questions were set to attain the objectives of the present study:

1. Does the development of the Moroccan women status implemented before the Arab uprisings by Mohammed VI help maintain the country's stability during the uprisings?
2. After the Arab uprisings, do women maintain the same love for their country and to the king to maintain the state's stability?
3. Did women discourage or encourage the upheavals of (2011, Rif Hirak, Jerrada Hirak, and the online social boycotts...)?

### V. METHODOLOGY:

To reach a representative number of respondents and, through them, a reliable set of findings, a quantitative survey was administered to 1000 respondents. In this study, a questionnaire was used to collect data about the Moroccans' perception of regime legitimacy and their attitudes towards the upheavals of 2011, 2016, 2017, and 2018. This study's context was Fes-Meknes Region (Fes city, Meknes city, Elhajeb, Azro, and the Middle Atlas), Tangier city, Rabat City, and Oujda city. The researcher dealt with schools, universities, streets, cafés, garden parks, trains, and bus stations as Moroccans' samples of their different social, economic, demographic, and educational levels. The data were collected during six months between (November 2017 and April 2018). As far as the nature of the survey the researcher conducted is concerned, she needed to talk to people directly to gather reliable data that concerns the Moroccan attitudes of different geographic (rural and urban) and demographic (gender, age, occupation) segmentation. The choice of the sample is based on the nature of the survey which obliges the researcher to collect data in different settings, time slots and with many Moroccans of their different backgrounds. For data analysis, the latest version of statistical software (XLSTAT 2018) was used to analyze the extracted data. The questionnaire was divided into three clusters. The nature of the questions the questionnaire included was Likert-scale, 'yes-no' questions and options to tick.

### VI. RESULTS:

#### *Reliability statistics:*

The internal consistency of the questionnaire is tested by the use of the Cronbach's Alpha. The findings show that the items of the questionnaire are reliable at 0.823, meaning that the analysis of the different scales is reliable. Thus, the measurement of the internal consistency shows that the set of items are closely related as a group. In brief,  $\alpha = 0.823$  indicates a good level of reliability.

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.823	11

*Age, Gender, Educational Level and Geographical Location:*

The age of the respondents is between 15 and over 60. Concerning the gender frequency distribution, women made up 50,80%, and men made up 49, 20%.The respondents are geographically dispersed among urban areas where women made up 48,24% and Men 51,75%. While in rural Areas, women made up 50,62%, and men made up 49, 37%.

*The perception of Moroccans towards the regime legitimacy:*

The item that addresses the respondents' perception towards the regime legitimacy includes three options: their willingness to defend Morocco's stability and the King, and towards their feelings on how interested are they in the King's life and news. The following results were the major parameters (Figure 1&Figure 2):

Concerning the sub-question: 'I am willing to defend Morocco's stability with any price it takes,' the majority of young and old female and male respondents with low and high educational levels claimed a 'strong yes' that they are willing to defend Morocco's stability.

According to the sub-question: 'I am willing to defend my king,' females showed their strong willingness to defend the King more than males. The majority of young female and male respondents with low or higher educational levels stated a 'strong yes' that they are willing to defend their King.

For to the sub-question: 'I am interested in the King's life and news,' females and males do not seem fully interested in the King's life and news, but females tend to be more tolerated towards this particular sub-question

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) :

Eigenvalues:

	F1	F2	F3
Eigen values	1,996	0,669	0,335
Variability (%)	66,548	22,297	11,155
% Cumulated	66,548	88,845	100,000




Figure 1. PCA Scree plot. F1: Willingness to defend the country. F2: willingness to defend the King. F3: Being interested in the King's life and news

**Biplot (axes F1 et F2 : 88,84 %)**




Figure 2 Please check the appropriate answer that describes best your feelings: A. 'I am willing to defend Morocco's stability with any price it takes.' B. 'I am willing to defend my King.' C. 'I am interested in the King's life and news'

These results reveal that most respondents claimed that they are willing to defend their country and King, and they showed their interest in the King's life and news. However, a good percentage of respondents (females and males) stated their indifference in the King's life and news.

Thus, to be specific towards females' attitudes towards defending the country and the King seem highly positive. Putting it vividly, the monarchical agenda on building a positive image towards the King and keeping women's trust in the Moroccan state, in particular, has succeeded.

These results highlight the understanding of the perception of Moroccans towards regime legitimacy. To put this into practice, the following section identifies females' role and their power in either encouraging or discouraging the upheavals. The next set of items investigates the role of females in encouraging or discouraging their family members from going into political or social upheavals.



The perception and the attitude of Moroccans towards the upheavals of 2011, 2016, 2017, and 2018.

Table 1. Have you ever encouraged one of your male family members (son, husband, brother, father) to participate in one of the upheavals (e.g., for social or political demands, human rights, 2011 demonstrations, Rif Hirak) ?/Age Females & Males

Females	N	Y	Total	Males	N	Y	Total
15-29	53,976	68,817	56,693	15-29	58,500	57,609	58,333
30-40	15,904	10,753	14,961	30-40	3,750	1,087	3,252
40-60	29,157	20,430	27,559	40-60	33,750	39,130	34,756
Over 60	0,964	0,000	0,787	Over 60	4,000	2,174	3,659
Total	100	100	100	Total	100	100	100

Concerning the percentage of respondents' agreement of encouraging one of the respondent's male family members (son, husband, brother, father...) to participate in one of the upheavals (e.g., for social or political demands, human rights, 2011 demonstrations, Rif Hirak ...) according to age, about 63,24% of respondents between the ages of 15-29 said 'yes,' and about 68,81% of females from the same age segment said 'yes.' However, males from the same age segments said 'no' they have never encouraged any male family member to participate in one of the upheavals. For the age segment of 30-40, about 15,9% of respondents said 'no,' about 15,9% of females claimed 'no,' and about 3,75% of males from the same age segments said 'no' as well. For the age segment of 40-60, about 30,3% said 'no,' about 29,15% of females said 'no,' and about 39,13% of males from the same age segment said 'yes' they have encouraged one of the male family members to participate in one of the upheavals. Whereas respondents over 60 years old claimed 'no' (3,55%), they have never encouraged any male family member to participate in one of the upheavals.

These results reveal that almost the majority of respondents of all age segments were negative and claimed they have never encouraged any male family member to participate in one of the upheavals. Apart from female respondents between the age segment of 15-29 and male respondents of the age segment 40-60 who claimed they encouraged one of the male respondents to participate in the upheavals.

This growing segment of females is considered to be the highly educated females who get access to the Internet, use social media to voice their demands, and encourage other male respondents to act in the country's socio-political life.

This fact leads us to wonder whether a good percentage of females have participated in the upheavals? Moreover, did female respondents from this same age segment encourage female family members to join the upheavals?

Table 2. Has any female family member (mother, wife, daughter, sister...) ever encouraged you to participate in one of the upheavals (e.g.2011/ Rif Hirak)?/Age/Females & Males

Females	15-29	30-40	40-60	Over 60	Total	Males	15-29	30-40	40-60	Over 60	Total
N	91,667	89,474	90,714	100,000	91,142	N	92,334	100,000	88,889	88,889	91,260
Y	8,333	10,526	9,286	0,000	8,858	Y	7,666	0,000	11,111	11,111	8,740
Total	100	100	100	100	100	Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2 shows agreement's percentages of if a female family member (mother, wife, daughter, sister...) has ever encouraged respondents to participate in one of the upheavals (e.g., 2011/ Rif Hirak ) according to age. About 91,66% of female respondents between the ages of 15-29 said 'no,' and males (92,33%) from the same age segment said 'no,' no female family member has ever encouraged them to participate in one of the upheavals. For the age segment of 30-40, about 89,47% of females claimed 'no,' and about 100% of males from the same age segments said 'no,' as well. For the age segment of 40-60, about 90,71% of females said 'no,' and about 88,88% of males from the same age segment said 'no.' Whereas female respondents over 60 years old claimed 'no' (100%), and males (88,88%) from the same age segment said 'no' that no female family member has ever encouraged them to participate in one of the upheavals.

These results reveal that the majority of respondents of all age segments were negative and claimed that no female family member has ever encouraged them to participate in one of the upheavals.

Table 3. Have you ever encouraged one of your female family members (daughter, sister, wife, mother, aunt) to participate in one of the upheavals (e.g., for social or political demands, human rights, 2011 demonstrations, Rif Hirak)?/ Educational Level/Females

	0-level	Koranic School	High School	Primary School	Secondary School	University degree	Total
N	91,176	85,714	89,535	91,176	85,000	86,747	88,780
Y	8,824	14,286	10,465	8,824	15,000	13,253	11,220
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3 investigates the agreement's percentages of encouraging one of respondent's male family members (son, husband, brother, father...) to participate in one of the upheavals according to educational level. About 91,17% of illiterate females claimed 'no.' Female university degree respondents claimed 'no' as well (86,74%) . For secondary school degree, about 86,74% of female

respondents claimed 'no,' too. Also primary school degree respondents (91,17%) said 'no,' as well. High school female respondents (89,53%) proclaimed 'no.' On the other hand, for Koranic School degree, about 85,71% said 'no,' they have never encouraged any female family member to participate in one of the upheavals. These results show that the majority of respondents of their different educational levels have never encouraged any female family member to participate in one of the upheavals.

*Table 4. Has any female family member (mother, wife, daughter, sister) ever persuaded you not to go into an upheaval (e.g., 2011/ Rif HIRAK)?/Employment*

	N	Y	Total
Employee	24,067	13,609	22,300
Housewife	19,254	13,018	18,200
Jobless	5,776	3,550	5,400
Student	50,903	69,822	54,100
Total	100	100	100

The previous item focused on females' persuasion power in encouraging female and male respondents to join an upheaval. On the other hand, the following item investigates on the opposite if female family members persuade respondents not to go into an upheaval according to employment. About 69,82% of students claimed 'yes'. Concerning employees (24,06%) and housewives (19,25%) said 'no' that none of their female family members persuaded them not to go into an upheaval. These findings show that the majority of respondents claimed that none of their female family members advised them not to go into an upheaval.

*Table 5. Have you ever advised one of your family members not to participate in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK)?/ Gender*

	N	Y	Total
F	52,899	46,129	50,800
M	47,101	53,871	49,200
Total	100	100	100

Now, let us take the analysis to another angle and analyze respondents' persuasion towards their family members no to go into upheavals. Table 5 shows the agreement's percentages of advising one of the family members not to participate in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK) according to gender. About 52,89% of females said 'no,' and about 53,87% of males said 'yes,' that they have advised one of the family members not to participate in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK). These findings reveal that there are close percentages among females and males responses and among those respondents who claimed 'yes' and 'no'. Thus, giving advice concerning not to join an upheaval is something personal and differs from one person to the other according to the nature of their relationship with their family members.

*Table 6. If it is "yes," is it because: (a. It is better to get away from politics, it is for your good, b. May Allah praise our country and King, or c. No need, let us live in peace) / Gender*

	It is better to get away from politics; it is for your good	May Allah praise our country and King	No need; let us live in peace	Total
F	45,349	43,200	49,020	45,687
M	54,651	56,800	50,980	54,313
Total	100	100	100	100

If the above findings concentrated on the percentages of respondents who advised their family members not to participate in the upheavals, Table 6 illustrates percentages of the reasons behind advising one of the family members not to participate in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK) according to gender. About 49,02% of females have chosen 'No need, let us live in peace,' followed by 'It is better to get away from politics, it is for your own good' (45,34%). Whereas males chose the reason of 'May Allah praise our country and King' (56,80%) as the most common reason behind advising one of the family members not to participate in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK).

*Table 7. Have you ever participated in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK)?/ Age*

	15-29	30-40	40-60	Over 60	Total
N	74,435	80,435	78,457	68,182	76,100
Y	25,565	19,565	21,543	31,818	23,900
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The previous items focused on the relationship between respondents and their family members' attitudes towards the upheavals while Table 7 addresses the respondents directly and investigates about their participation in the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK) according to age. The findings show that about 80,43% of respondents between the ages of 30-40 said 'no,' they have never participated in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK). For the age segment of 40-60, about 78,45% of respondents claimed 'no.' While, for the age segment of 15-29, about 74,43% and about 68,18% of respondents over 60 years old claimed also 'no' that they have never participated in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK).

These results reveal that the majority of respondents of all age segments were negative and claimed that they have never participated in one of the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK). The more negative respondents were among the age segment of 30-40.

Table 8. 'If yes, among these options who pushed you to do so? (a. One of your neighbors, b. One of your family members, c. Social media (Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube), d. The current situation' / Gender

	One of your neighbors	One of your family members	Social media (Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube)	The current situation	Total
F	44,444	41,860	34,615	29,921	34,167
M	55,556	58,140	65,385	70,079	65,833
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Putting these findings vividly, two questions addressing those who participated in the upheavals were necessary to have a complete idea about the respondents' attitudes. Table 8 shows the percentages of the push factors that encouraged respondents to participate in the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK) according to gender. About 44,44% of female respondents chose 'one of their neighbors,' about 41,86% chose 'One of their family members'. While 34,61% chose 'Social media,' and about 29,92% of female respondents chose the push factor of 'The current situation.'

Whereas, for male respondents, about 70,07% chose 'the current situation.' About 65,38% chose 'Social media.' While about 58,14% chose 'One of their family members' and about 55,55% chose the push factor of 'One of their neighbors' as one of the most common factors that push them to participate in the upheavals.

These results show that the majority of female respondents chose 'one of their neighbors,' and male respondents chose the current situation coupled with social media as the primary common push factors behind participating in the upheavals.

Table 9. 'What were the respondents' motivations to participate in the upheavals? (a. Social demands, b. Political demands, c. Human Rights demands, d. Joining demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating without having any particular reason) / Gender

	Social demands	Political demands	Human Rights demands	Joining demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating	Total
F	36,036	25,000	35,577	15,385	34,167
M	63,964	75,000	64,423	84,615	65,833
Total	100	100	100	100	100

If the above item investigated the push factors behind participating in the upheavals, Table 9 shows the percentages of respondents' motivations to participate in the upheavals (2011/ Rif HIRAK) according to gender. About 36,03% of female respondents chose 'Social demands.' About 35,57% chose 'Human rights demands, and about 25% of female respondents chose the motive power of 'political demands.' Followed by the motive of 'Joining demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating' (15,38%).

Whereas, for male respondents, about 84,61% of respondents chose 'Joining demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating.' About 75% chose 'Political demands.' About 64,42% chose human rights demands,' while about 63,96% of respondents chose the motive power of 'social demands' as one among the most frequent motivations that encourage them to participate in the upheavals.

These results show that the majority of females chose 'social demands,' whereas the majority of males chose 'Joining demonstrations for the sake of demonstrating' as the most common motivation behind participating in the upheavals.

**VII. DISCUSSION:**

These general findings draw us back to the significant questions the paper works on. Moroccan women play an essential role in maintaining the state and society's stability. The surveyed respondents, in their majority, confirmed the validity of this postulation in its different dimensions. Regardless of their geographical and demographic segmentation, female respondents do not encourage other respondents, especially males, to go into upheavals. Moreover, females neither encourage nor discourage their family members from going into upheavals. Although women do gain power and feel powerful among their family members and in their households, their power does not take the form of encouraging other male family members to participate in any upheaval. Their strength cannot be used for trembling the country's stability nor for questioning the legitimacy of the monarch for many reasons that were discussed in the literature review.

Thus, the development of the Moroccan women status implemented before the Arab uprisings by Mohammed VI helped maintain the country's stability during the uprisings. The findings reveal that females' attitudes towards defending the country and the King seem highly positive towards this matter. Putting it vividly, the monarchical agenda on building a positive image towards the King and keeping women's trust in the Moroccan state, in particular, has succeeded. According to these findings and in relation to legitimacy, the state enjoys citizens' support in light of their views of what is best from public perception and not because of fear or favor.

The findings of the survey also point to the fact that young female students and middle-aged and old housewives think positively towards promoting stability in the country, the same thing for male students and jobless males who claimed that they advised one of their family members not to go into upheavals for three significant reasons: (1) 'No need. Let us live in peace.' (2) 'It is better to get away from politics, it is for your good,' and (3) 'May Allah praise our country and King'. These findings confirm that choosing the three reasons behind not going into upheavals is not a mere coincidence. They are choices that are engraved in Moroccan's traditional political culture since the independence, and it was re-fired with the different aspects of legitimacy that Mohammed VI is using in response to the different challenges.

Building on that, the monarchy's religious legitimacy has proven its persistence as it is well rooted in Morocco culturally and historically within the borders of the historical authority of the Makhzen<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, most upheavals that the Moroccan state has witnessed do not question the monarchical institution per se, but they ask for reform renewal of the state and society. The legitimacy in the Islamic Moroccan heritage rests upon specific 'Islamic manifestations of power' (Daadaoui, 2011).

Whereas, for those who claimed that they have participated in one of the upheavals, the findings reveal that most female and male respondents chose 'Social media', 'One of their neighbors,' and 'The current situation' as one of the most common push factors behind participating in the upheavals.

Here comes social media's crucial role in transforming many perceptions, drawing attention to the many social and economic problems that the Moroccan state is suffering from. Facebook becomes a demo motivator for mobilizing the government, civil society, and monarchical institutions to handle any crisis quickly and efficiently. The influence of elites and educated young females and males is mingled with social media to transfer their appetite for social change and raise public opinion and awareness of every reform or problem.

Considering the literature review, with the debate of who is responsible for the continuous social sparks, some researchers claim that the Internet, especially Facebook had a significant impact on starting the social movements by sharing information, communicating, and organizing protests among citizens. On the other hand, others claim that Facebook is not the tool to blame, but youths are to credit for speeding revolutions using the Internet.

In between the two positions, it is crystal clear that the Internet has helped speed revolutions and transfer them from online to offline movements, but it is erroneous to blame technology alone for triggering the revolutions. In the case of Morocco, the use of Facebook has not the role of toppling the regime. Nevertheless, people use it nowadays to spotlight specific social, cultural, and behavioral issues that touch their daily life matters and try to change some behaviors that were in a certain period considered taboos. Nowadays, Facebook is used to change some ministers and government officials, change some reforms, and bring new ones that promote social development and social change.

Finally, regardless of whether the majority have participated in the upheavals or not, challenging the monarch to provide essential social services for all citizens, initiating a liberalization process, and giving political space to protest movements were necessary for maintaining its legitimacy. In the last decades, Arab regimes started losing its legitimacy, as Wiktorowicz (2000) claimed. For him, economic crises, high levels of debt and inflation, challenge 'the majority of regimes which were urged to adopt liberalization policies in what he called "defensive democratization." Thus, regime survival strategy in the face of horrible world economic conditions by state-sponsored political reforms hindered the emergence of new forms of legitimacy.

#### VIII. CONCLUSION:

For the Moroccan case, the February 20 Movement was a step that inspired people to demand change. Thus, using a specific mixture of various factors at specific times led to the constitutional reform and the fading of the February 20 Movement, as was apparent on the surface. However, seven years later, Moroccans that the state dealt with within 2011 were not the same in 2018. Citizens become much aware of their rights and speak out their disapproval with several online services, and products. Therefore, is the state capable of stopping the new shaking online waves through these same strategies?

Many congruent reasons led to the reform of 2011, which were based on the disintegration of the political party scene, the readiness of Moroccan citizens for accumulative change, and the nature of the relationship between the King and his citizens that do not cause any threat to the monarchy's legitimacy per se.

Nonetheless, many demands are now spoken out in the streets, but with online platforms creating then a new era of online activism and citizenship. Therefore, the 2011 constitution was just a temporary extinguisher of the demonstrations at that time. 2016, 2017, and 2018 were years of social and economic demands. If the state could extinguish the upheavals of 2011 by reforming the 'given constitution' as was called by February 20 Movement, or absorb the 2016 and 2017's Hiraks/movements by the political earthquake, is it possible to downsize the massive Facebook shares and online protests quickly? The state needs to revisit its ways of exercising power. The Facebook upheavals need more than a 2011 constitution or a political earthquake. People need a new way for social peace management to be dealt with. The majority of the boycotters/ online activists call for separation of powers, independent justice, a prosperous economy based on rules of law, and accountability with the elite who possess authoritarian power and exercise nepotism in all fields.

Overall, because of its heterogenic nature, Morocco needs a monarchical institution to rule it. Moroccans are aware of that; the various social and political upheavals that Morocco witnessed during King Mohammed VI's reign call for justice, social demands and human rights. Ensuring a good standard of life is the major demand of any Moroccan. Downsizing employers' salaries or downsizing the employment offers in the public sector, or going through any political austerity is the start of the end of the state's stability.

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<sup>6</sup> The Makhzen is a form of traditional government that remained in place after decolonization and endures to exist nowadays in usual usage. It symbolizes a connotation to the monarchical system in its totality, centered on the renovation and restoration of the Cherifian Sultanat. Its three main functions are summarized in defending the territory from external penetrations, serving as a referee in intra-tribal and group conflicts, and controlling production's critical centers (Bartolucci, 2010.). In another definition, Makhzen denotes the formal royal institutor and informal networks that constitute the center of power. It originally meant 'warehouse.' It is also in contrast to the *bled-as-siba*, i.e., the autonomous tribes (Hegazy, 2007).



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